

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 09NICOSIA179, CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09NICOSIA179**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09NICOSIA179</a>	<a href="#">2009-03-12 09:42</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Nicosia</a>

Appears in these articles:

[www.tanea.gr](http://www.tanea.gr)

VZCZCXYZ0007  
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNC #0179 0710942  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 120942Z MAR 09  
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9703

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000179

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT (S. CLARK) AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018  
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [EFIN](#) [ENRG](#) [KCIP](#) [CY](#)  
SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

REF: SECSTATE 15113

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

¶1. (U) This telegram contains Embassy Nicosia's assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources on Cyprus which, if destroyed, disrupted, or exploited, might have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States. Embassy responses are keyed to Reftel.

¶2. (SBU) Reftel Para 13: The Embassy does not believe that the loss of Cyprus-owned physical infrastructure, nor the interruption of key resource exports from the island, would immediately affect the security, national economic security, and/or public health or safety of the United States. A Connecticut-sized Mediterranean island some 5000 miles from the East Coast of the United States, Cyprus simply is too small, too distant, and too lacking in natural resources to affect U.S. interests in that fashion. We are unaware of any direct physical linkages, such as pipelines or undersea telephone cables, between Cyprus and the United States, for example. Similarly, there are no sole or predominantly Cyprus-sourced minerals or chemicals on which U.S. industry is dependent.

¶3. (C) Reftel Para 10: Under the terms of the 1960 independence treaties, Great Britain was allowed to retain two "Sovereign Base Areas" (SBAs) and several isolated sites scattered throughout Cyprus, such as the RAF radar dome on Mt. Olympus, the island's highest point, and various antenna arrays in Ayios Nikolaos, near Famagusta. Via varied formal agreements and informal arrangements, the United States enjoys some access to and benefits from these UK facilities. Unlike the Cyprus-owned infrastructure noted above, the damage or complete loss of SBA-housed facilities would pose a threat to our national security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

¶4. (SBU) Embassy staff regularly raise concerns regarding vulnerabilities to local infrastructure with Cypriot interlocutors and have offered ideas, funding, and training to meet them. Other Mission elements have engaged Cypriot counterparts in hopes of improving their humanitarian relief and crisis response operations.

Urbancic